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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows.
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic
analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the
Kennedy Space Center Photo/Video Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall
Space Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the
mission.

Photo 1 : Launch of Shuttle Mission STS-68
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1.0 SUMMARY
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 17 August
1994. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-1 also included the primary flight elements
OV-105 Endeavour (7th flight), ET-65 (LWT 58), and BI-067 SRB's. There were no vehicle
anomalies or significant debris issues.
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 18 August 1994 during the two
hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no Launch Commit Criteria (LCC),
OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR's were taken. Due to the ambient weather
conditions at this time of year, there were no acreage icing concerns. There were also no
protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
The launch was aborted at T-1.9 seconds MET because of an SSME #3 Failure Identification due
to the High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump discharge temperature exceeding a redline limit.
A post drain inspection of the vehicle and pad was performed 18-19 August 1994. There was no
significant damage to the vehicle as a result of the abort. However, TPS erosion occurred on the
aft surfaces of the following areas of the External Tank: +Y ET/SRB vertical strut, LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical cable tray clam shell, LH2 recirculation line, and LH2 feedline bellows. This erosion was
caused by the alignment of the new Firex water spray nozzles and the higher operating water
pressures.
Post abort film analysis showed all three SSME's formed Mach diamonds. Nothing unusual in the
engine start sequence, mainstage, and subsequent shutdown was noted by NASA and Rocketdyne
engineers. After SSME shutdown, a considerable amount of burning hydrogen was visible in the
SSME plumes/exhaust hole area. Hydrogen exiting the SSME #2 and #1 nozzles following
quench coincident with FIREX water activation re-ignited but continued moving downward into
the exhaust hole.
FIREX water deluge in the Orbiter base heat shield/SSME area appeared adequate. Water
directed at the LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilicals from the MLP deck was also adequate and
reached as high as the thrust strut-to-longeron interfaces. Although alignment of the FIREX
nozzles was generally good, the stream of water covering the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical was
directed at the outboard side of the +Y ET/SRB vertical strut. Water directed at the LH2
ET/ORB umbilical appeared to impinge the LH2 feedline area.
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle for the second launch attempt was
conducted on 29 September 1994. There were no significant facility or vehicle anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded on 30 September 1994. There were no Launch Commit Criteria
(LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. One facility IPR were taken on a safety sign
not removed from the FSS. Due to the ambient weather conditions at this time of year, there were
no acreage icing concerns. There were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the
established data base.
After the 7:16 a.m. (local) launch on 30 September 1994, a debris walk down of Pad 39A was
performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. At the time of the walkdown, the
LH2 TSM door was closed and external surfaces showed no signs of damage. Launch films
showed the door remained open as the SSME's passed by during liftoff. Post launch data revealed
the door stayed open until T+7 seconds MET. Evidence of flame intrusion and exhaust plume
impingement inside the TSM was discovered during the post launch inspection. The door did not
close properly due to the structural failure of brackets holding the bonnet safety pin guide tube.
The brackets were replaced in all the TSM's.
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A total of 118filmsandvideoswereanalyzed as part of the post launch data review. The vehicle
sustained no significant damage or lost flight hardware that would have affected the mission. Two
white vapor-like streaks, or trails, streamed past the RH OMS pod and crossed the SSME plume
at T+36 seconds MET. Deep tile damage observed on the RH OMS pod leading edge tiles in
orbit by the flight crew was most likely the result of a debris impact manifesting itself as the two
white vapor trails, which may have been pulverized tile material.
Several white objects fell aft of the vehicle at T+44 seconds MET. The objects appeared to
originate from the Orbiter nose area and were most likely FRCS paper covers. One of these
covers may have contacted the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer and disintegrated into very
small pieces. Shallow tile damage observed on the vertical stabilizer leading edge during the post
landing inspection may have been caused by FRCS paper cover impacts.
On-orbit photography revealed nominal separation of SRB's from the External Tank. Separation
of the ET from the Orbiter was also normal. Foam, approximately 12 inches long by 4 inches
wide, was missing from an External Tank intertank stringer head forward of the bipods. The divot
exposed the substrate.
Downlinked imagery of window streaks and the RH OMS pod tile damage were reviewed during
the mission. The window streaks were similar in size and appearance to streaks/deposits left by
FRCS paper covers and RTV bonding material documented photographically on previous flights.
This was an expected occurrence.
Images of the RH OMS pod leading edge tiles showed a deep damage site (5-inches by 3-inches
by 2-inches to substrate) indicative of an impact by a dense particle. A debris impact in this area
could not be discerned due to the lighting conditions and atmospheric haze affecting the tracking
films. However, the two white vapor-like streaks passing the RH OMS pod at T+36 seconds
MET may have been pulverized tile material.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after retrieval. From a debris standpoint,
both SRB's were in good condition. Both frustums had a combined total of 41 MSA-2 debonds.
Orbiter performance as viewed on landing films and videos during final approach, touchdown, and
rollout was nominal. Drag chute operation was also normal.
A post landing inspection of OV-105 Endeavour was conducted on the runway at Dryden Flight
Research Center/Edwards AFB. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 110 hits, of which 15 had a
major dimension of one inch or greater. Based on these numbers and comparison to statistics from
previous missions of similar configuration, both the total number of debris hits and the number of
hits 1-inch or larger was slightly less than average. The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 59
hits, of which 9 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger The ET/Orbiter separation devices
functioned properly. No debris was found on the runway below the umbilical cavities.
The largest tile damage site on the Orbiter was located on the RH OMS pod forward facing
surface and measured 5 inches by 5 inches by 2 inches. This 6amage site had not been significantly
changed by re-entry aerodynamics/heating from the condition observed in the on-orbit video
review. The missing window #8 perimeter tile V070-390068-059 piece, reported by the flight
crew two days into the flight, most likely caused this damage. The edge of the tile fragment is
believed to be the source of three small tears/scuff marks on the payload bay doors in a line
between the original tile location and the damage site on the _ OMS pod. In addition, post flight
analysis of samples from the OMS pod damage site revealed the presence of black RCG tile
coating material. An improper repair to the cartier panel hole with subsequent contamination of
the SIP/bondline is the leading candidate for the loss of the tile (IFA STS-68-V-01).
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Orbiter post landingmicrochemicalsampleresultsrevealeda varietyof residualsin the Orbiter
window samplesfrom the window protectivecovers,SRB BSM exhaust,Orbiter TPS, RCS
thrusterpapercovers,andpaints/primersfrom varioussources.Thelower surfacetile damagesite
containedSRB Hypalon paint particleswith no evidenceof other non-tile material in this
particular sample.The RH OMS pod tile damagesamplecontainedpiecesof black tile RCG
coatingandprovidedtheadditionaldatanecessaryto confirmthewindow #8perimetertile asthe
debris damagesource.The dataobtainedfrom the post abort GOX vent systern/ETfootprint
revealedthe presenceof a varietyof metallicparticulate. Theseresidualsamplingdata do not
indicatea singlesourceof damagingdebrisas all of the other materialshavepreviouslybeen
documentedin post landingsamplereports.The residualsampledatashowedno debris trends
whencomparedto previousmissiondata.
A total of ten Post LaunchAnomalies,includingone In-Flight Anomaly (IFA), were observed
during the STS-68 mission assessment.
2.0 ABORT
The launch of STS-68 was aborted at T-1.9 seconds MET because of an SSME #3 Failure
Identification due to the High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump discharge temperature exceeding a
redline limit.
2.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 17 August
1994 from 0930 to 1100 hours. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-1 also included the
primary flight elements OV-105 Endeavour (7th flight), ET-65 (LWT 58), and BI-067 SRB's.
There were no vehicle anomalies or significant debris issues. Five items were entered into S0007,
Appendix K for resolution prior to ET cryoload: loose MLP deck bolts near SRB HDP #3 and #8
along with various types of debris on the MLP deck, in the holddown post haunch areas, and on
the sound suppression downspout deflector.
2.2 FINAL INSPECTION
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 18 August 1994 from 0140 to
0255 hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR's were
taken. Due to the ambient weather conditions at this time of year, there were no acreage icing
concerns. There were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: (not OK)
T-3 Hours T-O Abort
Wind Speed (knots):
Wind Direction (degrees):
Relative Humidity (percent):
Temperature (degrees F):
Dew Point (degrees F):
07 08
163 186
90 92
73 78
70 75
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to scan the
vehicle for unusual temperature gradients, particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed
scanners, and to obtain a random sampling of vehicle surface temperature measurements to
thermally characterize the vehicle.
2.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS thruster paper covers were wet
from rainfall, but intact. Less than usual ice/frost accumulations were present at the SSME # 1 and
#2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. An infrared scan revealexl no unusual temperature gradients on
the base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields.
2.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the fixed STI radiometers ranged from 79 to 81 degrees F.
In comparison, temperatures measured by the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEl)
ranged from 80 to 83 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F
minimum requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bu_k Temperature (PMBT) supplied by
MTI was 80 degrees F, which was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F.
2.5 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a general comparison to
infrared scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost
accumulation on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
The Final Inspection Team observed light condensate, but no ice/frost accumulations, on the LO2
tank. There were no TPS anomalies.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Typical ice/frost accumulation, but no unusual
vapor, was present on the ET umbilical carrier plate.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, but no ice/frost
accumulations, were present on the acreage.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. A crack, 8 inches long by 3/8 inch
wide, was present in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray forward surface TPS. The presence of the crack
was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows while less than usual
amounts of ice/frost were present in the support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost fingers on the separation
bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical.
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. Some
vapors were venting from the -Z bellows (ET side) area. The LH2 feedline bellows were filled
with condensate, ice, and frost.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier top and outboard sides. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the pyro canister and plate
gap purge vents. The 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam plug was properly closed
out. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and
launch.
The summary of Ice Team observations/anomalies consisted of three OTV items after ET
cryoload and one visual inspection item after drain:
Anomaly 001 documented an 8-inch by 3/8-inch crack in the forward surface TPS of the -Y
vertical strut/ET-SRB cable tray.
Anomaly 002 documented excessive ice formations around the GUCP. The accumulation of ice
started after the launch abort due to a facility GH2 ice suppression problem. The condition was
addressed in IPR MLP-1-147.
Anomaly 003 documented numerous black marks or residue, approximately 1-inch in diameter, in
the -Y GOX vent seal footprint area.
Anomaly 004 documented ET TPS "erosion" from FIREX water on the following areas (aft
surfaces): +Y SRB vertical strut and cable tray support closeout, LH2 ET/ORB umbilical feodline
bellows closeout, LH2 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray fairing (clam shell) and elbow, LH2
recirculation line.
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2.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and _roperly configured for launch (LCC
requirement).
No leaks or unusual amounts of vapor were observed on either the LO2 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals, the GH2 vent line, or the GUCP.
No damage to the ET nosecone/footprint area was visible after the GOX vent hood was retracted.
However, numerous black marks or residue, approximately 1-inch in diameter, were present in the
-Y GOX vent seal footprint area.
2.7 POST DRAIN SSV/PAD WALKDOWN
A post drain inspection of the vehicle was performed at Pad-39A on 18 August 1994 from 1230
to 1415 hours.
There were 13 black marks measuring approximately 1-inch in diameter in the -Y nose cone
footprint area just below the GOX vent louvers. This was the first such occurrence observed
during a post drain inspection.
There were no TPS anomalies (divots or cracks) on the LO2 tank, intertank or LH2 tank acreage.
Some ice remained in the LO2 feedline support brackets, but no loose foam or TPS cracks were
visible.
Bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with adjacent LH2 tank-to-intertank flange
closeout foam.
The 8-inch by 3/8-inch crack in the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS was
still visible.
TPS erosion was observed on the aft surfaces of the following areas: +Y ET/SRB vertical strut,
LH2 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray clam shell, LH2 recirculation line, and LH2 feedline bellows.
This erosion was caused by the alignment of the new Firex water spray nozzles and the higher
operating water pressures.
Numerous damage sites (approximately 12) were visible on the orbiter base heat shield tiles with
the largest site measuring 2-inches by 1-inch. The fight hand OMS lower aft surface tiles appeared
to have a small number of damage sites. A protruding piece of tile shim was observed at the
center of the body flap upper surface.
The upper surfaces of both the fight and left hand inboard elevons showed brown discolored areas
that were probably the result of hydrogen burning and/or dirty deluge water.
Paint scale (debris) lay on numerous areas of the MLP deck.
No anomalies were observed on the Solid Rocket Boosters or MLP.
Other than the TPS erosion on the ET as the result of the Firex water spray impingement, no
significant vehicle damage was observed during the preliminary post drain inspection.
A second inspection of the STS-68 vehicle on Pad 39A was performed on 19 August 1994 from
0930 to 1130 hours.
Orbiter SSME #3 exhibited no visible anomalies. Two repairs to the hot wall cooling tubes at the
nozzle exit plane were not related to the engine anomaly.
A yellow GSE shim protruded from the center of the body flap (+Z side).
There was no TPS damage observed on the External Tank aft dome, apex, manhole cover or aft
hard point closeouts.
TherewasnoapparentTPSdamageon the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical, feedline, and cable tray with
the exception of a small gouge on the clam shell flange closeout inboard aft corner. TPS damage
by water erosion on the +Y vertical strut appeared to be limited to an area of 12 inches by 6
inches by 1/4 inch depth (average) on the aft surface and 18 inches by l-l/2 inches by 1/2 inch
depth (max) on the outboard surface along the edge. No substrate or SLA was exposed. A
protruding piece of foam immediately aft of the crossbeam showed similar erosion damage.
There was no apparent damage to the -Y vertical strut TPS.
TPS damage by FIREX water erosion occurred on the aft surface of the LH2 recirculation line
and bellows closeout (Orbiter side), the LH2 feedline bellows closeout (Orbiter side), the LH2
ET/ORB umbilical cable tray near the drain hole, clam shell closeout, and flange closeout
outboard aft comer. The erosion damage appeared to average 1/4-inch in depth. No damage was
visible on the inboard surfaces of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical.
Loose foam was visible in the LO2 feedline support bracket XT-1623.
Thirteen dark, circular features aft of the southwest louver on the foot print area were caused by
residue/discoloration from the GOX vent seal and not the result of missing topcoat. Samples of
the residue analyzed in the materials laboratory revealed pipe scale. This is a maintenance concern
and a blow-down of the entire system should correct the problem.
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Photo 2 : SSME Shutdown During Launch Abort
Visual indication of SSME shutdown is manifested by disappearance of SSME #3 Mach diamond
l0

Photo 3 : Free Burning Hydrogen After SSME Shutdown
Free burning hydrogen exited the SSME nozzles and drifted upward from the SSME exhaust hole
ll
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Photo 4 : Activation of FIREX Water Spray
Hydrogen from SSME shutdown re-ignites about the same time FIREX is activated
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2.8 FILM REVIEW
A total of 36 films and videos, including five 35mm large format films, fifteen 16mm high speed
films, and sixteen videos, were reviewed.
Igniter smoke and pre-ignition free burning hydrogen was blown under the body flap by southerly
winds (OTV 063, E-5). Green vapors in the free burning hydrogen rising in the direction of the
base heat shield have been observed during other SSME start sequences and are most likely the
result of pad stadium lighting, pad perimeter lighting, time of day lighting, and/or burning
contaminants, such as RCS paper covers, from a source external to the SSME's.
SSME ignition caused ice to fall from the LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilicals. In some cases, the
ice contacted tiles along the aft edge of the umbilical cavities, but no tile damage was visible
(OTV 009).
All three SSME's formed Mach diamonds. Nothing unusual in the engine start sequence,
mainstage, and subsequent shutdown was noted by NASA and Rocketdyne engineers. After
SSME shutdown, a considerable amount of burning hydrogen was visible in the SSME
plumes/exhaust hole area. Hydrogen exiting the SSME #2 and #1 nozzles following quench
coincident with FIREX water activation re-ignited but continued moving downward into the
exhaust hole (E-2, -3, - 19, -20, -76, -77).
FIREX water deluge in the Orbiter base heat shield/SSME area appeared adequate. Water
directed at the LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilicals from the MLP deck was also adequate and
reached as high as the thrust strut-to-longeron interfaces. Although alignment of the FIREX
nozzles was generally good, the stream of water covering the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical was
directed at the outboard side of the +Y ET/SRB vertical strut. Water directed at the LH2
ET/ORB umbilical appeared to impinge the LH2 feedline area (OTV 009, E-5, -6).
Heat from SSME ignition/shutdown caused frost to melt on the ET nosecone louver and adjacent
TPS serrations. After the heat wave passed, frost formed again in the cold serrations (OTV 061 ).
No dark spots of residue/discoloration from the GOX vent seal, like those aft of the External
Tank nosecone southwest louver, occurred at the northeast louver.
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Photo 5 : Dark Residue on ET Nosecone Footprint Area
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°Photo 6 : LH2 Feedline and Recirculation Line TPS Erosion
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Photo 7 : +Y ET/SRB Vertical Strut TPS Erosion
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3.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was conducted
on 29 September 1994 at 0830 hours. The following personnel participated in various team
activities, assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in
this document.
J. Tatum NASA - KSC
G. Katnik NASA - KSC
B. Davis NASA - KSC
R. Speece NASA - KSC
B. Bowen NASA - KSC
J. Rivera NASA - KSC
M. Bassignani NASA - KSC
J. Cawby LSOC - SPC
M. Jaime LSOC - SPC
J. Blue LSOC - SPC
G. Fales LSOC - SPC
W. Richards LSOC - SPC
R. Seale LSOC - SPC
M. Wollam LSOC - SPC
Z. Byrns NASA - KSC
J. Stone Rockwell Dny
K. Mayer Rockwell LSS
M. Nowling MTI - LSS
S. Otto
K. Ely
H. Bowman
Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems Branch
Lead, Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
Digital Imaging Systems
Lead, Thermal Protection Systems
Infrared Scanning Systems
Lead, ET Mechanisms/Structures
ET Mechanisms, Structures
Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical & Pyro Systems
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4.0 LAUNCH
STS-68 was launched at 11:16:00.011 GMT (7:16 a.m. local) on 30 September 1994.
4.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on
September 29, 1994 from 1630 to 1800 hours. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-I
also included the primary flight elements OV-105 Endeavour (7th flight), ET-65 (LWT 58), and
BI-067 SRB's. There were no significant facility debris issues.
A blue nylon strap with a velcro fastener typically used to secure tygon tubes was wrapped
around the ET EO-3 fitting. The strap should have been removed when leak testing at the LO2
ET/ORB umbilical was completed. A lost-and-found PR was dispositioned by MPS to remove the
strap prior to RSS rotation.
A small flexible debris object, most likely a piece of tape, lay on the ET crossbeam near the
Orbiter lower surface tiles. Due to the location and lack of access, the object could not be
removed. Debris assessment found no threat to the Orbiter and the object was deemed no
constraint to launch.
4.2 FINAL INSPECTION
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 30 September 1994 from 0130
to 0235 hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. One facility IPR was
taken. Due to the ambient weather conditions at this time of year, there were no acreage icing
concerns. There were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were:
T-3 Hours T-0 Launch
Wind Speed (knots):
Wind Direction (degrees):
Relative Humidity (percent):
Temperature (degrees F):
Dew Point (degrees F):
06 10
087 071
75 71
80 80
71 70
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to scan the
vehicle for unusual temperature gradients, particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed
scanners, and to obtain a random sampling of vehicle sarface temperature measurements to
thermally characterize the vehicle.
4.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS thruster paper covers were intact
and dry. Less than usual ice/frost accumulations were present at the SSME #1 and #2 heat shield-
to-nozzle interfaces. An unusually large ice/frost formation, measuring 10-inches b.y 5-inches, was
observed on the SSME #3 (ME 2026) outboard (+Y) drain line exit on both extenor and interior
surfaces of the nozzle. Liquid oxygen falling from the drain line reached the brick surface of the
SSME flame trench before vaporizing. Ice Team and MPS engineers assessed the presence of the
ice and determined no SSME anomaly existed. The ice was not a debris threat to the vehicle and
not a constraint for launch. An infrared scan revealed no anusual temperature gradients on the
base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields. Condensate was present on base heat shield tiles
near SSME #2 and along the body flap hinge area.
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4.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the fixed STI radiometers ranged from 78 to 79 degrees F.
In comparison, temperatures measured by the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEl)
ranged from 80 to 83 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F
minimum requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by
MTI was 78 degrees F, which was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F.
4.5 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a general comparison to
infrared scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost
accumulation on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
The Final Inspection Team observed moderate amounts of condensate, but no ice or frost
accumulations, on the LO2 tank. There were no TPS anomalies.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Typical ice/frost accumulation, but no unusual
vapor, was present on the ET umbilical carrier plate.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Moderate amounts of condensate, but no
ice/frost accumulations, were present on the acreage.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. A crack, 10-inches long by 3/8-inch
wide, was present in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray forward surface TPS. The presence of the crack
was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
One spot frost spot appeared on the -Y longeron closeout and on the -Z side of the +Z manhole
cover closeout. A small flexible debris object, which lay on the forward surface of the ET
crossbeam and assessed as no debris threat to the Orbiter during the Pre-Launch Walkdown, was
still in the same location at the time of the Final Inspection.
All repairs to the ET TPS areas damaged by the Firex water spray during the abort were intact
and showed no ice or frost formations.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows while less than usual
amounts of ice/frost appeared in the support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost fingers on the separation
bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical.
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2
feedline bellows were filled with ice and frost. One small frost spot had formed on the aft surface
of the feedline.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier top and outboard sides. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the pyro canister and plate
gap purge vents. The 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam plug was properly closed
out, though light frost had formed on the aft comer of the closeout. No unusual vapors or
cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and launch.
The summary of Ice Team observations/anomalies, which were all acceptable for launch per the
NSTS-08303 criteria, consisted of five OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented ice/frost formations in the LO2 feedline support brackets and bellows,
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Anomaly002documenteda 3-foot nylonropewith cloth safetysignon the OWP/FSSwalkway
FSS135foot level (IPR68V-0140).
Anomaly 003 documented a 10-inch by 3/8-inch crack in the forward surface TPS of the -Y
vertical strut/ET-SRB cable tray.
Anomaly 004 documented 2-inch by 1-inch ice/frost formations on both +Y and -Y longeron
closeout edges.
Anomaly 005 documented ice/frost formations on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical purge vents and the
LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge vents, recirculation line bellows, and purge barrier.
4.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch (LCC
requirement).
No leaks were observed on either the LO2 or LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals, the GH2 vent line, or
the GUCP.
No damage to the ET nosecone/footprint area was visible after the GOX vent hood was retracted.
A 3-foot nylon rope with cloth safety sign on the OWP/FSS walkway (FSS 135 foot level) could
not be reached by the Final Inspection Team. IPR 68V-0140 was taken and dispositioned with a
no constraint to launch rationale. The vehicle was shielded from the rope and sign by the -Y OWP
curtain. The SRB exhaust plume would not affect the rope until the vehicle cleared the tower.
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Photo 8 : Overall View of STS-68 Vehicle
OV-105 Endeavour (7th flight), ET-65 (LWT 58), and BI-067 SRB's
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Photo 9 :
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No Ice or TPS Anomalies on External Tank Acreage
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Photo 10 : Large Ice Buildup on SSME #3 Drain Line
Unusually large ice/frost formation on SSME #3 outboard (+Y) drain line
extended 12 inches in the -Z direction along the nozzle exit
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Photo 11 : Large Ice Formation on SSME #3 Outboard Side
Liquid oxygen drips fell from drain line to bottom of flame trench before vaporizing
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5.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the Pad 39A, MLP, FSS and RSS was conducted on 30 September
1994 from 2 to 3.5 hours after launch.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found.
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP shoe EPON shim material was intact. There
was no visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. All of the north
HDP doghouse blast covers were in the closed position. Erosion of the blast covers was normal
with the exception of missing material on several southern comers. The SRB aft skirt purge lines
and T-0 umbilicals exhibited typical exhaust plume damage.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA), and GOX vent arm appeared
undamaged.
At the time of the walkdown, the LH2 TSM door was closed and external surfaces showed no
signs of damage. Launch films showed the door remained open as the SSME's passed by during
lifioff (PR PV-6-274767). Post launch data revealed the door stayed open until T+7 seconds
MET. Evidence of flame intrusion and exhaust plume impingement inside the TSM was
discovered during the post launch inspection. The door did not close properly due to the
structural failure of brackets holding the bonnet safety pin guide tube (middle support bracket
broken prior to launch and rusted front bracket broken during ignition). This condition caused the
guide tube to move and break the rear bracket. The resulting misalignment prevented the
retraction of the pyro pin. The PR was closed by repairing or replacing any guide tube support
brackets in all TSM's.
The GH2 vent line was latched on the seventh tooth of the latching mechanism, had no loose
cables (static retract lanyard), and appeared to have latched properly with no rebound. Vent line
insulation was tom and missing on the FSS.
Minor, but typical, pad damage included:
Numerous pieces of thin glass were found on the MLP west side presumably from the pad
stadium lights.
'CAUTION' sign was missing from OWP access arm (135 foot level), identified during
T-3 walkdown.
Open OIS panel doors on the 215' & 255' levels.
Cable tray cover on pad apron west of FSS.
15 foot section of SSME flame trench east side upper edge was tom loose and located in
pieces along the east crawlerway.
The pad cooling tower was leaking and a valve was hit by some debris, which broke the
valve stem off above the hand wheel.
Debris inspections of the pad acreage and flame trench were completed. No flight hardware or
TPS material was found.
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 10.
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Photo 12 : North Holddown Post Blast Cover Erosion
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6,0 FILM REVIEW
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team,
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers. No IPR's or In-Flight Anomalies were generated
as a result of the film review. Post flight anomalies are listed in Section 10.
6.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 98 films and videos, which included thirty-eight 16mm films, nineteen 35ram films, four
70mm films, and thirty-seven videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
No vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission.
Dark carbon-type residue from the GOX seals was present again on the ET nosecone after the
GOX vent hood was retracted (OTV 062).
Free burning, green tinted hydrogen from SSME startup drifted past SSME #1 in the general
direction of the LH OMS pod (OTV 070, 071).
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the centerline area between the SSME
cluster occurred during engine start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous
launches (E-76, -77).
SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile appeared normal. Three streaks
occurred in the SSME #1 plume during startup (E-2). The unusually large ice/frost formation on
the SSME #3 drain line (reported during the Final Inspection at T-3 hours) was not visible at
lifioff and most likely fell aft during startup (OTV 051,070, 071).
SSME ignition caused a tile gap filler to protrude from the lower surface of the left inboard
elevon. The gap filler was still protruding from a location close to the elevon hinge near the
Orbiter aft fuselage as the vehicle left the field of view (OTV 009, 063,064; E-31).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. Some pieces
of ice contacted the umbilical cavity sill and were deflected outward, but no tile damage was
visible (OTV 009, 063).
The ET "twanged" approximately 31 inches before returning to the 12 inch mark at liftoff (E-79).
No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. No ordnance fragments or frangible
nut pieces fell from any of the DCS/stud holes. All north holddown posts doghouse blast covers
closed normally.
The Orbiter LH2 and LO2 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and retracted properly (E-17, -18).
However, the LH2 TSM bonnet door remained open after the SSME's had passed the top of the
TSM (E-I, -2, -5, -19, -25). The cause of the anomaly is described in Section 5.0. A small object,
possibly a pin or short cable, fell from the LH2 TSM external access platform and fell aft without
contacting the vehicle (E-18).
GUCP disconnect from the External Tank was nominal. Small ice particles, but no TPS, fell from
the interface area after disconnect (E-33). The GH2 vent line appeared to latch normally (OTV
004, 060; E-41, -42, -48, -50). Post launch inspection found the GH2 vent line latched on the
seventh tooth of the latching mechanism.
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Ice from the ET/SRBdiagonalandaft strutsfell aft shortlyafter T-0 andimpactedthe LH SRB
aft skirt without causinganydamage(E-57).
Large light-coloredpiecesof SRBthroat plug movednorth andupwardout of the SRB flame
trenchawayfromthevehicleafterliftoff. Largepiecesof ET/ORBLH2 umbilical icecontinuedto
fall duringearlyascent(TV-4A, E-63).
A white object,most likely a piece of SRB propellant or aft skirt instafoam, dropped out of the
RH SRB plume at 11:16:23.906 GMT (E-59). Numerous particles fell out of the SRB plume
during ascent and were most likely small chunks of propellant. One noticeably large piece was
visible at 11:16:26.375 GMT (E-52,-57).
Two white vapor-like streaks, or trails, streamed past the RH OMS pod and crossed the SSME
plume at T+36 seconds MET (E-207, -222, -223, -224). Deep tile damage observed on the RH
OMS pod leading edge tiles in orbit by the flight crew was most likely the result of a debris
impact manifesting itself as the two white vapor trails, which may have been pulverized tile
material.
Two white objects, probably RCS paper covers, first became visible in the area of the vertical
stabilizer falling aft at 11:16:36.148 GMT. Several more white particles, most likely FRCS paper
covers, passed the RH OMS pod in this same time frame. However, RCS paper covers tend to
cause shallow tile damage sites rather than the deep damage observed on the RH OMS pod.
Two small white objects were visible just forward of the vertical stabilizer moving aft at
11:16:43.661 GMT. White wispy vapor was observed aft of the OMS pod/vertical stabilizer at
11:16:43.761. A third white object was first visible near the base of the vertical stabilizer falling
aft at 11:16:44.033 GMT. The white objects appeared to originate from the Orbiter nose area and
are most likely FRCS paper covers. One of these covers may have contacted the leading edge of
the vertical stabilizer and disintegrated into very small pieces giving the appearance of a vapor
trail (TV-4A; E-223, -224). Shallow tile damage observed on the vertical stabilizer leading edge
during the post landing inspection may have been caused by FRCS paper cover impacts.
All SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield closeout blankets appeared to be intact and missing no
material (E-207).
Several flashes occurred in the SSME plume during ascent (E-205, -218).
Body flap movement (amplitude and frequency) was similar to previous flights (E-207, -213).
Numerous small pieces of SRB propellant fell out of tae plume during ascent - a typical
occurrence (E-212).
Exhaust plume recirculation and ET aft dome outgassing/charring was typical. SRB plume tailoff
and separation appeared normal. Slag was visible in the SRB plumes during and after separation
(TV-5, - 13; E-207, -208, -212, -220).
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Photo 13 : Open LH2 TSM Door at Liftoff
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Photo 14 : LH2 TSM Door Remained Open Until T+7 Seconds
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Photo 15 : Vapor-Like Streaks Past RI/OMS Pod
Since localized condensation collars were not present on other parts of the vehicle, vapor trails
streaming aft of the RH OMS pod are believed to be related to the debris impact that damaged the
OMS pod leading edge tile rather than any type of atmospheric phenomenon. The actual debris
impact was not visible in the film due to the lighting conditions.
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6.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew. Hand-held video footage and thirty-eight still
images were obtained of the ET after separation from the Orbiter. OV-105 was equipped to carry
umbilical cameras: 16mm motion picture with J mm lens: 16ram motion picture with 10ram lens:
35mm still views. Data was obtained from all sources. In addition, images of streaks on the
forward facing windows, the missing perimeter tile from window #8, and damage to the RH OMS
pod leading edge tile were downlinked during the mission.
No vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have been a safety of flight
concern. No material was missing from the forward part of the External Tank (LO2 tank and
nosecone) that could have caused the damage to the Orbiter RH OMS pod tiles.
SRB separation from the External Tank was nominal. A dark object, most likely a piece of
charred foam, fell aft from an area behind the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray.
ET separation from the Orbiter was nominal. The BSM bum scars on the LO2 tank were typical.
No anomalies were apparent on the nosecone, LO2 tank acreage, PAL ramps, RSS antennae,
flight door, bipod ramps, LO2 feed line, and aft hard point. Erosion of the manhole cover
closeouts and aft dome apex was also typical. A fiat, thin, 5-inch diameter piece of foam tumbled
aft past the -Y thrust strut after ET separation. The piece of foam may have originated from the
divot in the LH2 tank acreage or the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout +Y+Z quadrant.
Foam, approximately 12 inches in length by 4 inches wide, was missing from an intertank stringer
head at XT-1050 forward of the bipods and to the -Y side of centerline. The divot exposed the
substrate. Less than usual shallow "popcorn" type divots were visible in stringer valleys on the +Z
intertank acreage forward of the bipods.
Both bipodjack pad closeouts were intact and appeared to be in excellent condition.
A divot, approximately 5 inches in diameter but shallow in depth, occurred in the LH2 tank
acreage aft of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout between the -Y thrust panel and the -Y
bipod spindle housing closeout.
Two divots, 10 to 12 inches in diameter, were present in the intertank acreage/stringers adjacent
to and into the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout on the -Z side of the tank between the RSS
antenna and -Z intertank vent. A third divot, approximately 8 to l 0 inches in diameter, occurred in
the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout aft of the flight umbilical carrier plate area. A fourth
divot approximately 6 inches in diameter was visible in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout
in the +Y+Z quadrant on the +Y side of the LO2 feedline.
The +Y thrust strut and LO2 feedline flange foam closeouts exhibited minor erosion.
The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition with no observed TPS damage.
The red purge seal was intact. Blistering of the fire barrier coating was typical. Frozen hydrogen
had dislodged from the 17-inch flapper valve but was still attached to the disconnect. Foam was
missing or eroded from the horizontal section of the cable tray, the LH2 feedline outboard
support bracket, and the aft surface of the -Y vertical strut.
Likewise, no TPS damage was observed on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Numerous divots and
eroded areas were visible on the horizontal section of the cable tray. Dark shadow prevented
examination of the red purge seal and the lightning contact strips.
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KSC reviewedthe downlinkedimageryof the window sUeaksandRH OMS pod tile damage
duringthemission.
The window streaksweresimilarin sizeandappearancetc, streaks/deposits left by FRCS paper
covers and RTV bonding material documented photographically on previous flights. This was an
expected occurrence.
Images of the RH OMS pod leading edge tiles showed a deep damage site (5-inches by 3-inches
by 2-inches to substrate) indicative of an impact by a dense particle. A debris impact in this area
could not be discerned due to the lighting conditions and atmospheric haze affecting the tracking
films. However, the two white vapor-like streaks passing the RH OMS pod at T+36 seconds
MET may have been pulverized tile material.
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Photo 16 : Nominal SRB Separation from External Tank
Charting of vertical strut af_ surface TPS and erosion of LH2 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray TPS
was typical
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Photo 17 : Nominal ET Separation from Orbiter
No damage to ET/ORB umbilical TPS was visible. Large piece of frozen hydrogen
was loose but still attached to the 17-inch feedline flapper valve.
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Photo 18 : View of LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical and Feedline
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Photo 19: View of Jack PadCloseoutsand +Z Acreage
Foam, approximately 10 inches in length, was missing from an intertank stringer head at XT-1050
forward of the bipods. The divot exposed the substrate. The bipod jack pad closeouts were intact
and appeared to be in excellent condition.
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Photo 20 : View of Nosecone and -Y Acreage
No TPS damage was visible on the nosecone. BSM burn scar on the LO2 tank acreage was
typical. Note 8-10 inch divot at LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout aft of flight umbilical
carrier plate area.
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Photo 21 : View of Aft Dome and -Z Acreage
LO2 tank, LH2 tank, and aft dome TPS acreage were in good condition with no apparent
anomalies. Charting of aft dome and erosion of manhole cover TPS closeouts was typical. Note
two divots in intertank stringer head TPS at the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout area.
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Photo 22 : Streaks and Residue on Forward Facing Window
The window streaks were similar in size and appearance to streaks/deposits left by FRCS paper
covers and RTV bonding material documented photographically on previous flights.
40
-v-"
.,_i
Photo 23 : On-Orbit View of RH OMS Pod Tile Damage
Image taken by the flight crew of the RH OMS pod leading edge tiles showed a deep damage site
(5-inches by 3-inches by 2-inches to subslrate) indicative of an impact by a dense particle
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6.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
Eight 16ram films and seven videos of landing were reviewed.
Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. There were no anomalies when the
landing gear was extended. Touchdown of the left and right main gear was nominal and virtually
simultaneous.
The drag chute was deployed after breakover, but before the nose gear contacted the runway.
Drag chute deployment appeared nominal.
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. No obvious tile damage or unusual control
surface deflections were observed during rollout.
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7.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at CCAFS
Hangar AF on 3 October 1994. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in good condition.
7.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The RH nose cap was recovered. The only missing MSA-2 was the result of water impact.
The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 26 debonds over fasteners (Figure 1). Hypalon paint
was blistered/missing along the 395 ring frame where BTA had been applied. Some of the
underlying BTA was sooted. The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened
position.
The RH forward assembly exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both RSS antennae
covers/phenolic base plates were intact. Hypa!on paint was blistered/missing over the areas where
the BTA had been applied. No pins were missing from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. Trailing
edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, and
lEA covers appeared undamaged. The forward stiffener ring was damaged by water impact. The
aft booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring exhibited typical dehtmination. Aft skirt acreage TPS was
generally in good condition. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where the BTA
had been applied. The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated and
appeared to have functioned properly.
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Figure I : RH SRB Frustum
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Photo 24 : RH Nose Cap
The only missing MSA-2 was the result of water impact
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Photo 25 : RI-I Frustum
The R_H frustum was missing no TPS but had 26 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners
The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position.
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\Photo 26 : RH Forward Assembly
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Photo 27 : RH Aft Skirt
Aft: skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition.
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing where the BTA closeouts bad been applied.
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7.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 15 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners (Figure 2).
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing along the 395 ring frame where BTA had been applied. Some
of the underlying BTA was sooted. The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully
opened position.
The LH forward assembly acreage was missing no TPS but had one debond at the XB-445 ring
frame between the forward attach fitting and the flight door. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic
base plates were intact. Blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ET/SRB attach point.
No pins were missing from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good condition. In general, minor
trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB aft struts, ETA ring, lEA,
lEA covers, and stiffener rings appeared undamaged. The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts
were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring exhibited typical delamination Aft skirt acreage TPS was
generally in good condition. However, a 4"x2" area of MSA-2 was missing near the XB-1894
ring frame at the +Y axis between HDP #5 and #7. A second, smaller area was located near the
XB-1894 ring frame between the BSM's and the HDP #6 structure. Hypalon paint was blistered
over areas where BTA had been applied. The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers
were seated and appeared to have functioned properly.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 10.
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Photo 28 : LH Frustum
The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 15 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. Hypalon paint
was blister_:l/missing where the BTA ¢loseouts had been applied. All BSM aero heat shield
covers had locked in the fully opened position.
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Photo 29 : LH Forward Assembly
52
\',.iJ
vPhoto 30 : LH Aft Booster/Aft Skirt
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8.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing debris inspection of OV- 105 (Endeavour) was conducted 11 - 13 October 1994 at
the Dryden Flight Research Center/Edwards Air Force Base on Runway 22 and in the
Mate/Demate Device. This inspection was performed to identify debris impact damage and, if
possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 110 hits, of which 15 had a major
dimension of one inch or greater. This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat
shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of
these numbers to statistics from 49 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding missions
STS-23, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known debris sources),
indicates both the total number of hits and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was slightly less
than average (reference Figures 3-6).
The following table breaks down the STS-68 Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 9 59
Upper surface 3 36
Right side 1 5
Left side 0 1
Right OMS Pod 2 5
Left OMS Pod 0 4
TOTALS 15 110
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 59 hits, of which 9 had a major dimension of 1-inch
or larger. A tile damage site with embedded debris was found just forward of the LO2 ET/ORB
umbilical in tile number V070-190002-110 ET-3237. This debris was removed for material
identification analysis prior to the ferry flight. Another tile damage site with embedded debris was
located just aft of the nose landing gear door in tile number V070-391017-161 ET-9431. This
debris was removed and identified as gap filler material by TPS Engineering.
A cluster of hits occurred just aft of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. Two of these damage sites had a
major dimension larger than 1-inch. Cluster of hits aft of the LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilicals
are believed to be impacts from umbilical ice and purge barrier (baggie) material.
No tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris was identified during the inspection.
The largest tile damage site was located on the RH OMS pod forward facing surface and
measured 5 inches by 5 inches by 2 inches. This damage site had not been significantly changed by
re-entry aerodynamics/heating from the condition observed in the on-orbit video review. The
missing window #8 perimeter tile V070-390068-059 piece, reported by the flight crew two days
into the flight, most likely caused this damage (Figure 6). The edge of the tile fragment is believed
to be the source of three small tears/scuff marks on the payload bay doors in a line between the
original tile location and the damage site on the RH OMS pod. In addition, post flight analysis of
samples from the OMS pod damage site revealed the presence of black RCG tile coating material.
An improper repair to the carrier panel hole with subsequent contamination of the SIP/bondline is
the leading candidate for the loss of the tile (IFA STS-68-V-01).
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or brakes. The tires were in
excellent condition after a landing on the concrete runway.
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ET/OrbiterseparationdevicesEO-1,EO-2,andEO-3functionedproperlyandthedebrisplungers
were seated.All ET/Orbiter umbilical separationordnanceretention shutters were closed
properly.No significantamountsof foamorredpurgesealadheredto theLH2 ET/ORBumbilical
nearthe4-inchflappervalve.No debriswasfoundon therunwaybeneaththeET/ORBumbilical
cavities.
Thenumberof tile damage sites on the base heat shield was less than usual with the majority of
the hits occurring near the center of the heat shield. The Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS)
closeout blankets on all three SSME's were in excellent condition. Six TUFI tiles located on the
triangular carrier panel between and below SSME #2 and #3 sustained no damage.
Orbiter windows #2, 3, 4, and #5 exhibited light hazing and streaks with windows #3 and #4
showing the most streaks. Numerous small impact sites occurred on window #2, 3, 4, and 5
perimeter tiles. Seven tile damage sites with two larger than 1-inch were present between and
above windows #3 and 4. Tile hits in this area and window streaks have been attributed in the past
to impacts from FRCS paper covers and/or cover RTV adhesive. Surface wipes were taken from
all windows for laboratory analysis.
The drag chute appeared to have functioned nominally. All drag chute hardware was recovered
and showed no signs of abnormal operation. Tiles on the ,_ertical stabilizer "stinger" and around
the drag chute door were intact and undamaged.
Runway 22 had been swept/inspected by Air Force personnel prior to landing and all potentially
damaging debris was removed. A post landing walkdown of Runway 22 was performed
immediately atter landing. No Shuttle flight hardware was found on the runway.
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits 1-inch or
larger was slightly less than average when compared to previous missions (Figures 7-8). The type
of TPS damage is typical and not attributable to any single cebris source.
Orbiter Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 10.
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3 29 7 56
9 49 14 58
11 19 34 63
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25 69 36 154
14 66 20 87
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21 96 33 141
7 66 17 111
24 129 34 183
37 177 55 257
20 134 39 193
18 100 23 132
13 60 20 76
17 51 18 53
21 107 21 118
13 111 15 120
17 61 19 81
13 47 14 63
13 64 16 76
7 70 8 81
15 132 17 147
7 91 10 113
14 217 16 .238
23 153 25 197
24 122 25 131
14 100 25 182
6 74 9 101
18 122 22 172
6 55 11 114
28 141 45 184
11 186 22 236
3 48 11 108
6 152 16 290
11 145 23 240
14 80 14 131
18 94 36 156
10 128 13 143
10 75 12 106
8 100 18 154
23 78 26 155
7 59 13 120
4 48 15 106
7 36 16 97
10 47 19 77
17 123 21 151
18 116 19 150
A VERAGE 14.1 90.7 21.3 131.6
SIGMA 72 43.8 10.1 56.5
MISSIONS STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 3OR, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANAL YS
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOUR
Figure 7 : Orbiter Post Flight Debris Damage Summary
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Figure 8 : Orbiter Debris Damage Comparison Chart
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Photo 31 : Overall View of Orbiter Left Side
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Photo 32 : Overall View of Orbiter Right Side
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Photo 33 : Overall View of Orbiter Nose
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Photo 34 : Ames Gap Filler Embedded in Tile
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Photo 35 : L02 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo 36 : LH2 ET/Orbiter Umbilical
Note closeout foam intrusion near LH2 recirculation line disconnect
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Photo 37 : Window Streaks and Perimeter Tile Damage
Orbiter windows #2, 3, 4, and #5 exhibited light hazing and streaks with windows #3 and #4
showing the most streaks. Numerous small impact sites occurred on window #2, 3, 4, and 5
perimeter tiles. Seven tile damage sites with two larger than 1-inch were present between and
above windows #3 and 4. Tile hits in this area and window streaks have been attributed in the past
to impacts from FRCS paper covers and/or cover RTV adhesive.
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Photo 38 : Missing Perimeter Tile from Window #8
69
ORIGINAL PAGE
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
_J
/.
Photo 39 : Tear/Scuff Mark on Payload Bay Door FRSI
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tPhoto 40 : Impact Damage Site on RH OMS Pod
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9.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of ten samples were obtained from OV-105 Endeavour during the STS-68 post landing
debris assessment at Dryden Flight Research Center. The submitted samples included: 8 wipes
from Orbiter windows #1-8, 1 lower surface tile damage site debris, and 10MS pod tile damage
site sample. The samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis Branch
(MAB) for material composition and comparison to known STS materials. An additional sample
from the OMS pod tile damage site was submitted to the RI-DNY lab for analysis. Debris analysis
involves both the placing and the correlating of particles and residues with respect to composition,
thermal (mission) effects, and availability. Black residue from the GOX vent seal and ET seal land
area was sampled after the launch abort in August. Those results are included in this report.
Debris sample results/analyses are listed by Orbiter location in the following summaries.
9.1 ORBITER WINDOWS
Samples from the windows indicated exposure to SRB BSM exhaust (metallic particulate),
landing site materials (earth minerals), Orbiter Thermal Protection System (tile, tile repair, RTV
and glass insulation), paints and primer from various sources. The variety of paint particulate
colors (black, white, red, blue, green, and yellow) continues to be noted. Yellow paint particulate,
observed in the previous mission STS-64 sampling, contained lead, which is typically used in
facility/GSE paint. The window sample organic results are summarized in Figure 9. Specific
identified materials included those associated with window covers (plastic polymers), RTV from
RCS thruster nozzle cover adhesive and Orbiter TPS, and paint from various sources. There was
no apparent vehicle damage related to these residuals.
9.2 LOWER SURFACE TILE
The lower surface tile damage site analysis provided evidence of fibrous tile material, tile coating
material, and Hypalon paint particles. SRB Hypalon paint particles had been observed previously
in the STS-65 lower surface tile samples. The paint particulate may not necessarily be the cause of
the damage as tile damage sites have historically not retained the damage-causing debris.
9.3 RH OMS POD TILE
KSC lab results of the RH OMS pod tile damage site sample revealed fibrous tile, tile coating, and
fused fibrous tile materials. The RI-DNY lab analysis was similar, but included a particle identified
as black tile coating. The presence of the coating has been accepted as confirmation that the HRSI
from the Orbiter left upper observation window #8 caused the OMS pod tile impact damage.
9.4 ET GOX VENT SEAL/FOOTPRINT (POST ABORT)
After the GOX vent hood retracted at T-3 minutes, black residue was observed on the -Y GOX
vent seal footprint. The aborted launch attempt provided an opporttmity to access the ET nose
cone area and remove the GOX vent seal for chemical sampling. The results of the sampling are
included in Figure 9. This unique sample data provided indication of assorted metallic particulates
and inorganic contaminates. These data provide some enlightening as to the precise source of
previously reported debris correlations.
9.5 NEW FINDINGS
This set of post flight debris residual samples did not yield any new findings. However, the post
abort sample results from the GOX vent seal and ET footprint areas provided additional
informative source data for a variety of metallic particulate. These new data will be inclusively
resolved for the next debris mission publication.
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10.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, ten post launch anomalies, including one
In-Flight Anomaly (IFA), were observed on the STS-68 mission.
10.1 LAUNCH PAD/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY
1. MLP deck FIREX water spray nozzles caused TPS damage to the External Tank ET/ORB
umbilicals during the abort. The nozzles are aligned per a facility drawing, which may need to be
modified.
2. Dark residue from the GOX vent seals was present on the ET nosecooe footprint area after the
hood was retracted. Samples of the residue analyzed in the materials laboratory revealed pipe
scale. This is a maintenance concern and a blow-down of the entire system should correct the
problem.
3. The LH2 TSM door did not close until T+7 seconds MET. This condition allowed exhaust
plume impingement inside the TSM.
4. A cable tray cover was found on the pad apron west of the FSS after launch.
10.2 EXTERNAL TANK
1. Foam, approximately 10 inches in length, was missing from an intertank stringer head at XT-
1050 forward of the bipods and to the -Y side of centerline. The divot exposed the substrate.
2. A divot, approximately 5 inches in diameter but shallow in depth, occurred in the LH2 tank
acreage aft of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout between the -Y thrust panel and the -Y
bipod spindle housing closeout.
3. Two divots, 10 to 12 inches in diameter, were present in the intertank acreage/stringers
adjacent to and into the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout on the -Z side of the tank between
the RSS antenna and -Z intertank vent. A third divot, approximately 8 to 10 inches in diameter,
occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout aft of the flight umbilical carrier plate area.
A fourth divot approximately 6 inches in diameter was visible in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange
closeout in the +Y+Z quadrant on the +Y side of the LO2 feedline.
10.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
1. Both right and left frustums had a combined total of 41 MSA-2 debonds.
10.4 ORBITER
1. A tile gap filler protruded from the left inboard lower surface near the hinge during SSME
ignition.
2. An improper repair to the window perimeter tile carrier panel hole with subsequent
contamination of the SIP/bondline is the leading candidate for the loss of the tile fragment from
window #8 (IFA STS-68-V-01). The tile fragment fell aft during ascent causing small tears on the
payload bay doors and a deep impact site on the RH OMS pod.
74

APPENDIX A. JSC PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS SUMMARY
A

Space Shuttle
Photographic and Television
Analysis Project
STS-68 Summary of
Significant Events
December 8, 1994
A-1
Space Shuttle
Photographic and Television
Analysis Project
STS-68 Summary of Significant Events
Project Work Order - SN-52V
Lockheed
.3ff. "_ J_-,_- 95,
J. M. Disler, Project Analyst
Photo/TV Analysis Project
R. W. Payne, Project Specialist
Earth Science Branch Support
Approved By
NASA
Mike Gaunce, Lead
Photo/TV Analysis Project
Earth Science Branch
Jes_. Carnes, Operations Manager
Eartt_cience and Solar System Exploration
Division Support
Prepared By
Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company
for
Earth Science Branch
Earth Sciences and Solar System Exploration Division
Space and Life Sciences Dilectorate
A-2
Table of Contents
1.0 OV-105 STS-68 FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING SUMMARY
1.1 SCREENING ACTIVITIES
1.1.1 Launch
1.1.2 On Orbit
1.1.3 Landing
1.2 TIMING ACTIVITIES
2.0 SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ANALYSIS
2.1 DEBRIS
2.1.1 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition
2.1.1.1 LH2 and LO2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T- 0 Umbilical
Disconnect Debris
2.1.1.2 LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter Umbilical Disconnect Debris
2.1.1.3 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition
2.1.1.4 Debris after Liftoff
2.1.1.5 Debris seen Between 26 and 72 Seconds MET
2.2 MLP EVENTS
2.2.1 SRB Shoe Rotation
2.2.2 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-burning Hydrogen)
2.2.3 LH2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T-0 Housing Door Closing
2.3 ASCENT EVENTS
2.3.1 White Vapors Streaks
2.3.2 Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
2.3.3 Linear Optical Effect
2.3.4 Recirculation
2.4 ONBOARD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE ET (DTO-312)
2.4.1 Analysis of Handheld Photography of the ET from DTO-312
(Task #6)
2.4.2 Umbilical Well Camera Analysis (Task #5)
2.4.2.1 35 mm Umbilical Well Film Screening
2.4.2.2 16 mm Umbilical Well Film Screening (5 mm & 10 mm Lens)
2.5 ON-ORBIT EVENTS
2.6 LANDING EVENTS
2.6.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3)
2.6.1.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film
2.6.1.2 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video
2.6.2 Drag Chute Performance (Task #9)
2.6.3 Orbiter Height above Threshold (Task #13)
2.7 OTHER NORMAL EVENTS
2.8 STS-68 ABORT ANALYSIS (TASK #14)
2.9 OTHER
2.9.1 Film Screening for Missing Tile near Orbiter Overhead Window (W8)
2.9.2 Terminal Events Timing Interval (Task #11)
STS-68 JSC Summary Report A-3
List of Figures and Tables
Table 1.1.1
Table 1.2.1
Table 1.2.2
Figure 2.2.1
Figure 2.3.1
Figure 2.4.1
Figure 2.4.2.1
Figure 2.4.2.2
Figure 2.6.1.1a
Figure 2.6.1.1b
Figure 2.6.1.2a
Figure 2.6.1.2b
Figure 2.6.2.1
Figure 2.6.2.2
Figure 2.8.a
Figure 2.8b
Landing Event Times.
Film Camera Timing Determinations.
Film Camera Timing Determinations (continued).
Right SRB Shoe Rotation at Holddown Post M-2 (Camera E-8).
White Vapor Seen Aft of the Right ()MS Pod (Camera KTV-4A).
White Mark Visible on the ET LH2 Tank/Intertank Interface
(STS068-01-011).
Light Colored Mark on Intertank Stringer Head (STS068-300-060).
Frozen Hydrogen at LH2 Umbilical (5mm Lens, Frame 6095).
Graph of Right Main Gear Height Versus Time Prior to Touchdown
from Film.
Graph of Nose Gear Height Versus Time during Rollout from Film.
Graph of Right Main Gear Height Versus Time Prior to Touchdown
from Video.
Graph of Nose Gear Height Versus Time during Rollout from Video.
Heading Angle Versus Time.
Riser Angle Versus Time.
SSME #3 Shutdown on STS-68 Abcrt (Camera OTV-070).
Orange Vapor during STS-68 Abort (Camera OTV-070).
STS-68 JSC Summary Report A-4
1. OV-105 STS-68 FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
lo OV-105 STS-68 FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
SUMMARY
1.1 SCREENING ACTIVITIES
1.1.1 Launch
Endeavour (OV-105) launched on mission STS-68 from Pad A at 11:16:00.018
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on September 30, 1994 (day 273) as seen on camera
E-9. Solid rocket booster (SRB) separation occurred at 11:18:03.608 UTC as seen on
camera E-207.
On launch day, 22 videos were screened. Following launch day, 53 films were reviewed.
Camera E-62 did not run properly and was excluded from the received launch films.
No anomalies were observed during launch.
Several tracker camera films were re-screened in an effort to find events related to
damage seen on-orbit by the crew on the right OMS pod and debris smears on the Orbiter
windows. This re-screening was done at the request of the Mission Evaluation Room
Manager. While several pieces of debris were seen forward of the vertical stabilizer and
near the right OMS pod at different times during ascent, no definitive source for the right
OMS pod damage was found. However, the debris and two white streaks seen at
approximately 36 seconds MET are considered to be possibly related to the right OMS
pod damage. Sections 2.1.1.4 and 2.3.1 respectively provide more information on debris
and vapors streaks observed during ascent. No debris was seen in the vicinity of the
Orbiter windows.
Thirty-eight images of the STS-68 external tank were acquired after separation with a
Nikon camera using a 300 mm lens and a 2X extender (DTO-312, Method 3). Divots
seen on the external tank are described in section 2.4 of this report.
1.1.2 On-Orbit
No on-orbit events required PTAP support.
1.1.3 Landing
Two opportunities for landing of STS-68 on October 11, 1994 at the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) were waived due to weather constraints.
Endeavour landed on runway 22 at Edwards Airforce Base on October 11, 1994 (day
284). Six videos of the Orbiter's approach and landing were received. No anomalies
were detected during the screening of the replays. Left main gear touchdown was at
17:02:07.889 UTC, right main gear touchdown occurred at 17:02:08.990 UTC and nose
wheel touchdown was at 17:02:20.936 UTC as seen on camera DTV-1. Wheel stop was
noted at 17:03:08.817 UTC on camera DTV-1.
No major anomalies were noted in any of the approach, landing and rollout video views
screened.
The deployment of the drag chute appeared as expected. Event times were obtained from
camera DTV-1 and are shown below:
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Event Description
Drag chute initiation
Timing UTC
17:02:10.573 UTC
Drag chute release
Pilot chute inflation 17:02:11.426 UTC
Bag release 17:02:12.027 UTC
Drag chute inflation in reefed configuration 17:02:13.028 UTC
Drag chute inflation in disreefed configuration 17:02:16.198 UTC
17:02:45.260 UTC
Table 1.1.1 Landing Event Times.
The following items were noted during the post landing walk around: clear fluid
(possibly water) dripping from the TPS tiles near the LH2 umbilical area and off the LH2
umbilical door, a small discoloration noted on the LH2 umbilical well 4-inch disconnect,
slight TPS damage on the base heat shield between the SSMEs and on the top surface of
the body flap, TPS damage to the right OMS pod stinger, and slight tile damage near the
nose gear door. The drag chute housing and the tires appeared to be in satisfactory
condition.
1.2 TIMING ACTIVITIES
All videos except ET-208 had timing and film cameras Fi-1, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-6, E-7,
E-8, E-9, E-10, E-11, E-12, E-13, E-14, E-15, E-16, E-l'7, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-25, E-26,
E-52, E-54, E-57, E-59, E-222 and E-224 had in-frame alphanumeric timing. These
videos and films were used to time specific mission ever_ts during the initial screening.
The following events were timed on four film cameras:
Camera
E-207:
Frame
2425
Comments
Beginning of body flap motion
Timing (UTC)
273:11:16:40.741
2625 End of body flap motion 273:11:16:48.011
6403 White flash along right pod 273:11:17:45.709
5700 Start of recirculation 273:11:17:34.238
6430 End of recirculation 273:11:17:46.149
SRB separation
Film Camera Timing D_'terminations.
7508
Table 1.2.1
273:11:18:03.608
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Camera
E-208
E-220
E-223
Frame Comments
4091 Piece of debris fell from SRB plume
prior to SRB separation
4114 Piece of debris fell from SRB plume
prior to SRB separation
4430 SRB separation
4722 Debris
4751 Debris
4591 Single light colored piece of debris, first
seen forward of vertical stabilizer
4598 Same piece of debris last seen aft of
vertical stabilizer
5195 Flare noted in SSME plume
5603 Flare noted in SSME plume
Table 1.2.2 Film Camera Timing Determinations (continued).
Timing (UTC)
273:11:17:59.009
273:11:17:59.511
273:11:18:03.724
273:11:16:45.838
273:11:16:46.152
273:11:16:43.715
273:11:16:43.957
273:11:16:50.230
273:11:16:54.636
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2. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ANALYSIS
1
2.1
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ANALYSIS
DEBRIS
2.1.1 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition
2.1.1.1 LH2 and LO2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T- 0 Umbilical Disconnect
Debris
(Cameras E-5, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-25, E-76, E-77, OTV-049,
OTV-050, OTV-070)
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical
disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. None of the debris was observed to
strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested
2.1.1.2 LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter Umbilical Disconnect Debris
(Cameras E-5, E-6, E-25, E-26, E-31, E-36, E-40, E-57, E-60, OTV-O09,
OTV-054, OTV-063)
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and I_O2 ET/Orbiter umbilical
disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. Multiple pieces of light colored debris
(probably ice) were seen striking the umbilical sill and the electric cable tray during
SSME startup (as seen on OTV-009, OTV-063). No damage to the launch vehicle was
apparent in either case.
2.1.1.3 Debris Near the Time of SRB Ignition
(Cameras E-4, E-5, E-8, E-9, E-IO, E-11, E-14, E-16, E-25)
As on previous missions, several pieces of debris were noted originating from the SRB
flame duct area after SRB ignition. A single piece of red colored debris (probably flame
duct material) struck the right SRB holddown post M-2 lifter liftoff. A second piece of
debris (probably SOFI) struck the left SRB. No damage was observed in either case.
2.1.1.4 Debris after Liftoff
(Cameras E-34, E-40, E-52, E-54, E-57, E-59, E-60, E-63, E-76, E-205,
E-207, E-208, E-212, E-213, E-218, E-220, E-222, E-223, E-224, ET-208,
OTV-054, OTV-070, OTV-071, KTV-4A, XTV-13)
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle (SLV) at
lifioff, throughout the roll maneuver, and beyond on the launch tracking views. Most of
the debris sightings were probably reaction control system (RCS) paper or ice from the
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. None of the debris was observed to strike the vehicle.
2.1.1.5 Debris seen Between 26 and 72 Second_ MET
26 seconds - A single piece of light colored debris, first observed at the edge of the SRB
plume, broke into several small pieces as it traveled aft cf the vehicle. (Cameras E-52,
E-57, E-224)
36 seconds - A small piece of light colored debris was first observed near the leading
edge of the right OMS pod at I 1:16:36.183 UTC. The debris traveled aft of the vehicle
and was in view for 0.073 seconds. (Camera E-224)
-.,,j
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38 seconds - A small light colored piece of debris seen falling aft of the body flap
appeared to strike the left SRB aft skirt. No damage to the vehicle was detected.
(Camera E-207)
43 seconds - A single light colored piece of debris, first seen forward of the vertical
stabilizer, fell aft into the SRB plume. The debris appear to vaporize as it passed aft of
the vertical stabilizer. At approximately this time several pieces of debris were observed
falling aft of the base of the vertical stabilizer on cameras E-222 and E-224. (Cameras
E-205, E-223, E-222, E-224)
65 - 72 seconds - Multiple pieces of light colored debris were noted falling aft of the SLV
along the SRB plume. (Cameras E-220, KTV-4A)
2.2 MLP EVENTS
2.2.1 SRB Shoe Rotation
(Cameras E-8, E-13)
Figure 2.2.1 Right SRB Shoe Rotation at Holddown Post M-2
(Camera E-8).
SRB shoe rotation was observed on two SRB holddown posts: RSRB holddown post M-2
and LSRB holddown post M-6. No follow-up action was requested.
STS-68 JSC Summary Report A-9
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2.2.2 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-burning Hydrogen)
(Cameras OTV-063, OTV-070, OTV-071, E-16, E-18, E-20)
Orange vapor (probably free-burning hydrogen) was seen between the body flap and the
SRBs at T-5.673 seconds MET. Orange and green vapors were seen above the rims of
the SSMEs, near the vertical stabilizer, surrounding the left OMS nozzle, and forward of
the aft edge of the left OMS pod at T-5.305 seconds MET. This event has been noted on
past missions and would become a concern if the vapor was seen as high as the umbilical
areas. On this mission, however, the vapor was below the umbilicals and no follow-up
action was requested.
2.2.3 LH2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T-0 Housing Door Closing
(Cameras E-2, E-25, E-76)
The LH2 TSM T-0 housing door did not close after umbilical retraction at liftoff. No
follow-up action was requested.
2.3 ASCENT EVENTS
2.3.1 White Vapor Streaks
(Cameras E-223, E-224, E-205, E-207, E-222, KTV-4A)
Figure 2.3.1 White Vapor Seen Aft of the Right OMS Pod (Camera KTV-4A).
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Two white vapor streaks were seen originating from the forward edge of the right OMS
pod at 36.2 seconds MET (Figure 2.3.1). On camera E-224, a small light colored piece
of debris was observed near the leading edge of the right OMS pod 0.041 seconds prior
to the appearance of the white vapor streaks.
2.3.2 Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
(Camera E-207)
Body flap motion was seen on this mission. This event has been tracked on all missions
since reflight. Currently, motion data is being reviewed. If measurable motion is
determined, deflection measurements shall be reported.
2.3.3 Linear Optical Effect
(Cameras E-207, E-208, KTV-13, ET-208)
Linear optical effects were seen between 69 and 90 seconds MET. Engineers at JSC have
previously attributed this event seen on earlier missions, to the manifestation of shock
waves around the shuttle launch vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
2.3.4 Recirculation
(Cameras E-205, E-207)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the Shuttle Launch
Vehicle prior to SRB separation has been seen on nearly all previous missions.
Recirculation on STS-68 was observed between approximately 94 and 106 seconds MET
on camera E-207.
2.4 ONBOARD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE ET (DTO 312)
2.4.1 Analysis of Handheld Photography of the ET from DTO-312
(Task #6)
DTO-312 handheld photography of the STS-68 external tank (after separation) was
acquired using a Nikon camera with a 300 nun lens and a 2X extender (Method 3).
Thirty eight exposures from Magazine 01 were acquired. The exposure and focus is good
on all frames. Timing data is present on the film. The first picture was taken at 11:29:41
UTC (approximately 13.7 minutes after liftoff) and the last picture was taken at 11:34:50
UTC.
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Figure 2.4.1 White Mark Visible on the ET LH2 Tank/Intertank Interface
(STS068-01-011)
All sides of the external tank (ET) were imaged. The external tank appeared in good
condition. No unusual markings seen on the ET that were obvious candidates for the
source of damage to the Orbiter right OMS pod. Four white marks (probable divots)
were visible on the external tank TPS: (1) A white mark was visible on the side of the
external tank away from the Orbiter (+Y/-Z axis) at the LH2 tank/intertank interface
(Figure 2.4.1). This divot was approximately 13 by 11 inches in size. (2) A white mark
was visible on the LH2 tank TPS aft of the GUCP (-Y axis). (3) A white mark was
visible on the LH2 tank TPS just aft of the LH2 tank/intertank interface and in the -Y
direction from the forward ET/Orbiter attach bipod. (4) A white mark was visible on the
aft third of the hydrogen tank on the -Y axis.
Video of the external tank after separation from the Orbiter was taken by the astronauts.
Venting and white debris (probably ice) coming from the ET Orbiter umbilical area were
visible. These events are considered normal and no further analysis has been requested.
2.4.2 Umbilical Well Camera Analysis (Task #5)
Three rolls of STS-68 umbilical well camera film were received at JSC: the 35 mm film
from the LO2 umbilical and two 16 mm films (5 mm lens and 10 mm lens) from the LH2
umbilical.
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The +X translation maneuver was not performed on STS-68. Although all umbilical well
cameras performed nominally, the ET nose tip was not imaged on the 35mm umbilical
well film.
The following items seen on the umbilical well films are not considered anomalous but
do merit mentioning:
2.4.2.1 35 mm Umbilical Well Film Screening
Figure 2.4.2.1 Light Colored Mark on Intertank Stringer Head (STS068-300-060).
1) A light colored mark, probably missing TPS, is visible on an intertank stringer head
forward of the ET/Orbiter forward attach bipod. There is a dark area in the center of the
light colored mark(Figure 2.4.2.1). This mark measured 12 by 5 inches in dimensions.
2) A light colored mark is visible on the aft edge of the cross beam just forward of the
LO2 umbilical.
3) Minor TPS erosion and voids are visible on the aft LO2 feed line bellows and support
bracket.
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4) Minor erosion or chipping on the LH2 tank TPS is visible in the -Y direction from the
LO2 feedline.
5) The small white erosion or "pop corn" marks visible on the intertank in the vicinity of
the forward ET/Orbiter attach bipod are less than seen on most previous missions.
6) Multiple TPS erosion marks and voids are visible on the LH2 tank TPS in the -Y
direction from the aft LO2 feed line support bracket just forward of the cross beam.
7) Small white debris objects are visible throughout the film sequence. Many of these
white debris objects appear to be frozen hydrogen.
Note: The LO2 umbilical is in shadow and is difficult to see. The presence of the LO2
lightning contact strips was not verified. The presence of the red seal around the EO-3
fitting was not confirmed.
2.4.2.2 16 mm Umbilical Well Film Screening (5 mm & 10 mm Lens)
1) Numerous light colored pieces of debris (probably insulation) are in view throughout
the SRB film sequence. Typical chipping and erosion of the electric cable tray are
visible. Erosion and scarring of the ET/LSRB aft attach are visible. A blistering of the
fire barrier coating on the outboard side of the LH2 umbilical is apparent.
2) A string like flexible piece of debris first seen near the vertical component of the
electric cable tray and then moving in front of the left SRB is visible on the 10 mm lens
view prior to SRB separation (frames 334 through 410).
3) A dark, rectangular shaped piece of debris can be seen coming from behind the electric
cable tray on the 5 mm lens view prior to SRB separation (frame 934).
4) A partially detached piece of TPS is visible at the base of the ET/LSRB attach after
SRB separation. Debris is visible falling from the ET/LSRB attach area after SRB
separation.
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Figure 2.4.2.2 Frozen Hydrogen at LH2 Umbilical (5mm Lens, Frame 6095).
5) A large piece of frozen hydrogen is visible in the orifice of the LH2 umbilical 17 inch
line connect after ET separation. A white mark near the cross beam is visible forward
and to the right of the LH2 umbilical (5 mm lens frame 6095). KSC reported that the
white area was ice on a fitting which is not insulated. The red seal near the EO-2 fitting
appeared in place.
6) A small light colored piece of debris can be seen striking the base of the horizontal
section of the electric cable tray on the 5 mm lens view after ET separation (frame 2677).
White debris (frozen hydrogen) is also visible striking the electric cable tray on frame
3476. No damage to the ET is visible.
7) A flat, thin piece of debris is visible tumbling aft along the -Y thrust strut after ET
separation on the 10 mm lens view (frame 6740).
8) A bright appearing piece of debris is visible on the +Y side of the ET after ET
separation on the 10 mm lens view (frame 8402).
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2.5 ON-ORBIT EVENTS
There were no on-orbit events which required PTAP support.
2.6 LANDING EVENTS
2.6.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3)
The sink rate of the Orbiter was determined over a one-second interval prior to main gear
and nose gear touchdown. The calculation method described in section 2.6.1.1 was used
for all nose and main gear sink rate determinations.
2.6.1.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film
(Cameras E-1008, E-1036)
Camera E-1036 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear. The
analysis considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to
touchdown. Data was gathered for each frame at a sample rate of 24 frames per
second. Scaling information was determined by using the diameter of the main gear.
The main gear height above the ground for each frame was calculated by multiplying
the digitized height and the scaling factor. These heights were then regressed with
respect to time. Sink rate equals the slope of this regression line. The main gear sink
rate was determined to be 2.20 feet per second. The graph of the main gear height
versus time is shown on Figure 2.6.1.1 a.
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Figure 2.6.1.1a Graph of Right Main Gear Height Versus Time Prior to Touchdown
from Film.
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Camera E-1008 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the nose gear. The
analysis considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to
touchdown. Data was gathered at a sample rate of 25 frzmes per second. The nose
gear sink rate was determined to be 5.59 feet per second. The graph of the nose gear
height versus time is shown on Figure 2.6.1. lb.
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Figure 2.6.1.1b Graph of Nose Gear Height Versus Ttme during Rollout from Film.
2.6.1.2 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video
(Cameras TV-3, NASA SELECT)
Camera TV-3 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear. The
analysis considered approximately one second of imager2' immediately prior to
touchdown. Data was gathered at a sample rate of 30 fra:nes per second. The main
gear sink rate was determined to be 2.51 feet per second. The graph of the main gear
height versus time is shown on Figure 2.6.1.2a.
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Figure 2.6.1.2a Graph of Right Main Gear Height Versus Time Prior to
Touchdown from Video.
Camera NASA SELECT was used to determine the landing sink rate of the nose gear.
The analysis considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to
touchdown. Data was gathered at a sample rate of 30 frames per second. The nose
gear sink rate was determined to be 6.19 feet per second. The graph of the nose gear
height versus time is shown on Figure 2.6.1.2b.
STS-68 JSC Summary Report A-18
2. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ANALYSIS
STS-68 nose gear sink rate (camera NASA SELECT)
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Figure 2.6.1.2b Graph of Nose Gear Height Versus Time during Rollout from Video.
2.6.2 Drag Chute Performance (Task #9)
The landing of Endeavour at the end of mission STS-68 1narked the eighteenth
deployment of the Orbiter drag chute. The deployment of the drag chute appeared as
expected. Event times were obtained from camera DTV- 1. See section 1.1.3.
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Figure 2.6.2.2 Riser Angle Versus Time.
Standard analysis of the drag chute angles as a function of time was performed using the
views from the video camera labeled "Runway Camera" then verified with the film
cameras E-I030 and E- 103 I. This analysis is used to support the improvement of the
aerodynamic math models currently in use. Figure 2.6.2.1 presents the measured
heading angle versus time. Figure 2.6.2.2 presents the measured riser angle versus time.
The maximum measured horizontal chute deflection (heading angle) was approximately
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7.4 degrees to the port side of the vehicle. The vertical chute deflection (riser angle)
ranged from -6.2 to +4.2 degrees relative to the Orbiter coordinate system.
2.6.3 Orbiter Height above Threshold (Task #13)
The height of the Orbiter above the threshold at landing for the STS-68 mission was not
completed at the time of this report. The analysis request specifies that a camera with a
perpendicular view of the runway at the threshold location be used for the analysis. This
view is currently only available for landings at KSC. This analysis task will be
completed using alternative developmental methods as time is available.
2.7 OTHER NORMAL EVENTS
Other normal events observed include: normal SSME ignition sequence, body flap
vibration after SSME ignition, ET twang prior to liftoff, frost on the ET vent louvers
prior to liftoff, right and left inboard and outboard elevon vibration after SSME ignition
and at liftoff, RCS paper debris after SSME ignition, multiple pieces of white debris
(probably ice from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals) fell along the body flap after liftoff, ice and
vapor from the GUCP area during ET GH2 umbilical vent arm retraction, vapors from
the ET gaseous hydrogen umbilical disconnect during ezxly liftoff, multiple pieces of
dark debris in the exhaust cloud after liftoff, acoustic waves in the SRB exhaust plume
after liftoff, multiple pieces of light colored debris noted aft of the SLV before, during,
and after the roll maneuver, vapor from both SRB stiffener rings after liftoff, ET aft dome
outgassing, charring of the ET aft dome, flares in the SSME exhaust plume after the roll
maneuver, condensation around SLV after the roll mane aver, SRB plume brightening
prior to SRB separation, SRB separation, and slag in the SRB exhaust plume after SRB
separation.
Normal pad events observed were hydrogen ignitor operation, fixed service structure
(FSS) deluge water spray activation, sound suppression water initiation, multiple pieces
of light colored debris falling from the FSS during SSME ignition, latch back of the GH2
vent arm, and MLP deluge water operation.
2.8 STS-68 ABORT ANALYSIS (TASK #14)
On August 18, 1994, the launch of Endeavour (OV-105) was aborted at T-1.9 seconds
prior to liftoff.
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Figure 2.8a SSME #3 Shutdown on STS-68 Abor!
(Camera OTV-070).
Eight videos of the launch abort were screened and a report was distributed on August 18,
1994. Eighteen high speed films were screened on August 24, 25, and 26, 1994. Views
from cameras OTV-009, OTV-050, OTV-051, OTV-054, OTV-063, OTV-070, OTV-071
and film cameras E-2, E-5, E-19, E-20, E-77, and E-79A were used to compile a event
timeline. The STS-68 abort events were compared to the visual timeline for the STS-51
abort.
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Figure 2.8b Orange Vapor during STS-68 Abort
(Camera OTV-070).
The amount of orange vapors present on the STS-68 abort appeared less than that of STS-
51. The view of these vapor may have been inhibited by early morning lighting
conditions during the STS-68 launch. There were little or no indications of flames on
STS-68 (in contrast to STS-51). The bright pulses noted on some of the STS-68 camera
views were compared to STS-56 (a night launch). On both missions, the SSME yellow
burst events appeared as three bright pulses. The fourth and fifth bright pulses are not as
predominant as the first three and appear to be normal brightenings that occur prior to
Mach diamond formation. The abort screening analysis and the events timeline were
provided to the JSC Mission Evaluation Room (MER) manager.
2.9 OTHER
2.9.1 Film Screening for Missing Tile near Orbiter Overhead Window (W8)
(Tracking cameras E-54, E-59, E-204, E-207, E-213, E-220, E-222, E-223,
and all launch videos)
Launch views of the Orbiter overhead window were screened for indications of
the presence or absence of the tile missing along the inboard aft edge of the port
side overhead window (W8). The presence or absence of this tile during ascent
could not be confirmed from the launch camera views. The level of detail visible
was not adequate to resolve individual tiles in the vicinity of window W8. The
general area of the missing tile appeared white in color with no discolorations or
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other indications of damage on the best available views. Sun glare and/or view
angle hindered the analysis.
The Orbiter post-landing examination revealed that the missing tile may have
impacted both payload bay doors and struck the right OMS pod. In a brief
conversation with John Kowal/ES3 (TPS Subsystem Manger), a direct line of
Orbiter impact points lead to the tile damage location on the right OMS pod from
the missing port side tile.
2.9.2 Terminal Events Timing Interval (Task #11)
A detailed timeline of the SSME and SRB ignition sequences was generated and sent to
R. Fletcher/JSC-VF5.
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I . INTRODUCTION
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-68, the seventh
flight of the Orbiter Endeavour occurred on September 30, 1994,
at approximately 6:16 A.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch
Complex 39A (LC-39A), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida.
Extensive photographic and video coverage exists and has been
evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and flight
hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are
located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard the vehicle, and
upranqe and downrange tracking sites.
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis
objectives for STS-68 included, but were not limited to the
following:
a. Overall facility and shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems
c. Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB
separation time
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS)
integrity
e. Correct operation of the following:
I. Holddown post blast covers
2. SSME ignition
3. LH2 and LO2 17" disconnects
4. GH2 umbilical
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals
6. Free hydrogen ignitors
7. Vehicle clearances
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back
9. Vehicle motion
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT:
Film was received from fifty-two of fifty-three requested
cameras as well as video from twenty-two of twenty-two requested
cameras. The following table illustrates the camera data
received at MSFC for STS-68.
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Catm_ data re_v_ at M_
for STS-68
_LP
_in_r
Or_a_i
Tctak
16-_ 35ram Video
22 0 4
7 0 3
3 2 6
0 15 9
2 1 1
34 18 23
Totalnnni_r offilmsand videosreceivec_ 75
An individual motion picture camera assessment is provided
as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments of the
video products received at MSFC.
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
All ground cameras operated properly except for camera E-62
which provided no data. Most film exposures were dark resulting
in low contrast photographs. The dark exposures were due to the
insufficient light levels experienced during sunrise.
b. Onboard Camera Coverage:
Downlink video from the handheld camcorder was received.
This video shows approximately 6:45 of good quality video of the
ET after separation. Thirty-eight frames of the ET were
recorded by the astronauts while performing DTO-0312. These
photographs show all sides of the ET and were of excellent
quality. Thirty-five millimeter and 16mm films were received
from the orbiter umbilical well cameras. All cameras operated
properly.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
a. General Observations:
While viewing the film, several events were noted which
occur on most missions. These events consist of ice/frost
falling from the 17 inch disconnects during SSME ignition and
launch, small pieces of debris such as butcher paper and paper
hydrogen fire detectors falling aft during ascent, debris
induced streaks/flares in the SSME plumes, glowing debris
particles exiting the SRM plumes and slag from the SRM's prior
to and during SRB separation.
8-5

A streak in SSME#1was observed at liftoff from cameras
E-2 and E-19. This event is shown in Figure 1. The streak is
not typical of outside debris contamination.
Figure 1 Streak in engine 1
Debris (most likely water baggie material) from the SRM ignition
fell onto the right SRB aft skirt at holddown post M-2. This
debris is shown in Figure 2. No damage was observed.
Figure 2 Debris striking RSRB aft skirt
Coverage from the astronaut hand-held camera shows the tank
to be in good condition with only two divots located at the
intertank/LH2 tank scarf joint. These divots are located in the
B-6
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-Z area of the tank. Two divots were also observed on the LH2
tank acreage near the -Y axis. A picture from the hand-held
camera is provided as figure 3. A divot located along a
stringer on the intertank was observed from the umbilical well
cameras. This divot is in line with the +Z axis.
Figure 3 Film frame from hand-held camera
b. Debris/Vapors Near OMS Pod
White vapors were observed passing over the right OMS pod
at approximately T+36 seconds from several tracking cameras.
Figure 4 is a film frame from camera E-207 showing these vapors.
Figure 4 White vapors passing over right OMS pod
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A white debris object was also observed in this region as seen
in Figure 5 which is from camera E-222.
Figure 5 White debris object near right OMS pod
The source of the vapors cannot be determined. Lighting
conditions preclude good observations forward of the vehicle.
Possible evidence of these vapors passing over the payload bay
doors was noted by a change in lighting\shadow conditions in
camera TV-4.
At T+43 seconds debris was seen passing by the vertical
stabilizer. This event is shown in Figure 6 which is from
camera E-207.
Figure 6 Debris object near vertical stabilizer
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Identification of this debris is not possible forward of the
vertical stabilizer. However, this debris appears typical of
RCS motor cover paper.
V, ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times are determined from cameras that view the SRB
holddown posts numbers M-l, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
HOLDDOWN POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I E-9
M-2 E-8
M-5 E-12
M-6 E-13
273:11:16:00.018
273:11:16:00.019
273:11:16:00.019
273:11:16:00.017
<.
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined
to be approximately 31 inches. Figure 7 is a data plot showing
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and
vertical directions. A positive horizontal displacement
represents motion in the -Z direction. These data were derived
from film camera E-79A.
_c
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0.0
-'05sE
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I-------r------y------r--- I l .... -r, 4
i
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B---_ Vertical dlsplecement i
jl
I _______________L ___J- .... I 'ih_ m_'w
-4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0
Seconds Relative to T-0
Figure 7 ET Tip Deflection
B-9
-,wS
c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-68 was determined to be
273:11:18:03.71 UTC as recorded by tracking cameras E-212 and E-
208.
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